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1 The Problems of Constitutionalism  
 
Coetzee’s Disgrace can be read as an engagement with the post apartheid constitution 
of South Africa. However, the novel does not focus on a legal text. It draws attention 
to what could be called an ethics of social being or the psychic life of 
constitutionalism. Disgrace thus resonates with the broader argument that a 
constitution is a complex of political, social and psychic economies that are bound up 
with (and in certain senses prior) to positive law. Any proper elaboration of these 
themes cannot be made from within the terms of legal discourse itself, at least as 
presently composed.1  This paper is therefore an exercise in deconstruction2 or, an 
attempt to develop a “language that is foreign to what [a] community can already hear 
or understand only too well”3; a practice that will allow a cultural unconscious to 
speak through the text of Coetzee’s novel. But this problematic is not simply a 
question of language. An ethics of social being is also necessary. A culture must be 
held responsible for the symbolic forms of the secrets that it holds. How can we think 
about this strange matter? Our first task will be to engage with notions of being and 
social life that have not generally been deployed in constitutional discourse. We will 
then see how these terms relate to a psychoanalytic account of constitution at both a 
political and a personal level. The final section of this paper will be a reading of 
Disgrace.  
 
By means of an introduction, let us consider the plot of the novel. Disgrace is a novel 
organised around an interruption, a breaking open and apart of the main character’s 
life. David Lurie is a 52-year-old divorcee, a professor at ‘the Cape Technical 
University, formerly Cape Town University College.’4 Lurie teaches a course on 
Romantic poetry, and intends to write a book on Byron. He wants to believe in a 
culture of art and passion.  Bored by his teaching, barely inspired by his research, he 
seeks solace in a relationship with a prostitute, Soraya, and then, engages in a 
disastrous affair with one of his students. After failing (or refusing) to defend himself 
before a disciplinary board, he is dismissed and, in disgrace, heads out to his daughter 
Lucy’s smallholding near Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape.  
 
                                                 
∗ Thanks to Karin Van Marle, Wessel Le Roux and Mary Gearey whose labour allowed this paper to be 
written.  
1 This rather sweeping statement needs to be clarified. It is primarily a criticism of a form of 
constitutional discourse that limits itself to the study of the sources of constitutional law; and ignores 
wider problems of political belonging and political community. Elaborating this position would require 
a study of ‘English’ and South African constitutional scholarship, and the influence of positivism in 
these jurisdictions.  
2 Deconstruction is best understood as a way of reading texts. It has always been concerned with the 
way in which meanings are brought into being and governed.  The later phases of Derrida’s work, and 
the philosophy of Jean Luc Nancy, address the singularity of human being and questions of ethics and 
community. For an elaboration of these terms in the South African context, see Van der Walt, below, n 
10. 
3 J Derrida The Gift of Death (1985) 74. 
4 JM Coetzee Disgrace (1999) 3. 
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Entering into the routines of the country, assisting with farm work and helping out at 
an animal sanctuary, Lurie finds something of a new life. He has an affair with the 
woman who runs the sanctuary, Bev Shaw, and achieves a kind of stoic detachment 
from himself and his problems. Lurie is humbled by Bev Shaw’s compassion for the 
animals she has to treat, but mostly, to put down or destroy. Alongside these concerns, 
the novel plots Lurie’s relationship with his daughter; and his attempts to understand 
her sexuality. The novel hinges around a terrible incident, an attack by three strangers 
on Lurie and his daughter. Lurie is beaten up and set on fire; his daughter raped. 
Unwilling to leave her smallholding, Lucy falls under the protection of her former 
employee and neighbour, Petrus. Although the attackers are relatives of Petrus, Lucy 
persuades her father that the law must not be involved. She enters into a compromise 
where, in exchange for Petrus’ ongoing protection, she becomes his second wife. She 
also decides not to have an abortion, and to keep the child. Unable to influence events, 
Lurie leaves the farm. The novel concludes with a strained cordiality between him and 
his daughter. The closing scene is Lurie’s decision to put down a dog that he had been 
hoping to keep alive for a little longer.  
 
The constitution: men, women, things and animals. 
 
1.1 Social Being and Singularity  
 
We need to begin with an issue that appears obliquely in constitutional discourse: how 
the self relates to others.5 An account of social being that draws on deconstruction 
understands the self as singular and irreplaceable. This necessitates an engagement 
with the notion of being towards death. In turn this figure will be related to the 
possibility of ethics. We will return more explicitly to this statement at the end of this 
section. The self, then, is always on its way: always between birth and death. If this 
seems somewhat obscure, remember that we are trying to develop a set of terms for a 
reading of Disgrace, and (as we will see) the concern with death makes its appearance 
on the very first page of the novel.  
 
Death (to the extent that ‘it is’ at all) is always your own; no one can die in your 
place. One can give one’s life in the place of another  - but this is never a 
‘substitution’6 because the other must still go to his or her own death in his or her own 
time. A proper elaboration of this theme would take us to the animal that can be 
offered in sacrifice. We will return to this concern presently. The thesis so far can be 
reconstructed as follows: if I cannot take the other’s death from him/her, but I can die 
in his/her place, my death is the ‘irreplaceability’ that I must understand if I am to 
comprehend myself. Interiority, and indeed responsibility, is thus founded on what no 
one can take from me or do for me.7  
We need to consider the figure of the animal, as it is essential to the constitution of the 
human self. How is the man different from the beast? From within the Heideggarian 
resource, where we have begun posing this question, the animal is not understood to 
                                                 
5 In the interests of space, it is necessary to write in a kind of short hand. One of the primary reference 
points for this idea of self is Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. For a more thorough development of this 
theme, see Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey (2005) Critical Jurisprudence, Chapter 1.   
6 Derrida (n3 above) 43. 
7 Derrida (n3 above) 44. 
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experience death. But, does this resolve the issue? The following long quotation from 
Derrida is worth reading in full:  
Against, or without, Heidegger, one could point to a thousand signs that show that animals also die. 
Although the innumerable structural differences that separate one “species” from another should make 
us vigilant about any discourse on animality or bestiality in general, one can say that animals have a 
very significant relation to death…even if they have neither a relation to death nor to the “name” of 
death as such, nor, by the same token, to the other as such.8  
This is the question that both Disgrace and deconstruction force upon us. That 
animals die is, at one level, an entirely obvious statement. The question only becomes 
interesting when one addresses the symbolic relevance of death. If human being is 
constituted through anxiety towards death, and anxiety is based on language, then the 
statement that animals do not die begins to make sense. To be without language is to 
be incapable of representing death. Death thus has no meaning. By the same token, it 
would appear that animals do not have relations to each other as such. This takes us 
back to the same point about social being as peculiar to the creature that has language. 
Animal relationships are presumably matters of pure instinct. These assumptions beg 
a great deal of other questions about animal behaviour and intelligence that cannot be 
addressed here. Suffice to say that such distinctions between the animal and the 
human are at least contentious. Our primary concern, however, is what Derrida has 
called ‘carnophallogocentrism’ or, a ‘sacrificial structure’ that allows the ‘noncriminal 
putting to death’ of animals.9 
How do we understand this rather convoluted term? It brings together references to 
the eating of meat and to the phallus. ‘Logocentrcism, at least as far as this paper is 
concerned, can be understood as the centrality of the logos or language to the 
definition of the human. Carnophallogocentrism suggests that this manifold of 
language, psychic structure, sacrifice and carnivorousness constitutes both law and 
social being. A later section will engage with the psychoanalytic context of this 
statement, as the essential point is that human order is constituted by the sacrifice of 
the animal. In part this is an anthropological point. Human civilisation is marked by 
animal sacrifice as the creation of the properly human. Evidence would suggest that 
although animal sacrifice takes many different forms, it could be linked with the way 
in which the sacrificed creature takes death upon itself. To the extent that the sacrifice 
is an offering to the gods, it is an exchange, a bargain that attempts to preserve the 
fortunes or the viability of the human community. The human is to the extent that the 
animal can die in its place. The Derridean notion of the carnophallogocentric would 
also suggest that this sacrificial logic is what underlies the civilised as a legal order. 
Johan van der Walt has convincingly applied this logic to South African law10, but we 
cannot reconstruct his thesis here, as we need to return to the key issue raised by the 
question of animal sacrifice, the singularity of the human subject.  
 
Realising the reality of my own death allows me to comprehend my singularity and 
the possibilities of my life. In order to understand this logic as it relates to 
constitutionalism and Disgrace, we need to realise that death is part of a broader 
figure of the secret and the exchange; the problematic of something that cannot be 
shared or articulated, but which nevertheless demands articulation. The secret 
                                                 
8 J Derrida Aporias (1993) 75-6. 
9 C Wolfe Zoontologies (2003) 66. 
10 J van der Walt, Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (2005).  
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ultimately relates to human interiority, and is thus perhaps just another way of 
thinking about the human being as the creature who creates and conceals meanings. 
However, the secret can take a variety of forms (as we will see) and need not simply 
be a fear of death. It is specific to what an individual holds in his or her heart, in 
shame, celebration or disgrace, and which, although it might not be sayable, motivates 
actions and creates effects in the world. However, as is observed in Disgrace, the 
‘heart’ of the individual is dark. No one has access to it. To what extent does the 
secret open the question of ethics? It would suggest that social exchange is founded 
on something that cannot enter into circulation.  Ethics, then, is the taking upon 
oneself the responsibility for the singularity of one’s own life. This includes taking a 
responsibility for the meanings that one creates and the consequences of these 
meanings as they affect others.  
 
All this is very well- but how does it relate to a ‘thicker’ notion of social being? The 
individual is always part of a community and a history- and the choices and options 
open to the individual make sense against this background. The ethical demand is not 
a jurisdiction to answer to a particular summons, to be compelled to appear in a court 
to answer to charges, but to face an impossible decision or demand within a particular 
context. This is precisely the problematic that Disgrace traces. Already this needs to 
be clarified. The ethical law is inscribed within individual consciousness- the 
‘banished one’, (the one in disgrace?), the one expelled from a particular legal order, 
is ‘turned over to the absolute of the law.’11 What do we make of this? The ethical 
law is heard as a demand within the life of an individual being. The individual is 
separated from, clipped from the dumb repetition of his/her own days and stands 
alone amongst other beings. Abandoned by positive law, ethical law requires that one
confronts the singularity of one’s being and the values
 
 of one life.  
                                                
 
In summary, the question posed by Disgrace: can you give what you cannot afford?  
 
1.1.1 Psychoanalysis and the constitution: men, women and animals.  
 
In order to think about the relationship between the ethics of social being and the 
constitution of the self and the nation, to build a ‘thicker’ understanding of social 
being, it is necessary to make a brief digression through psychoanalytic theory.  
 
Psychoanalysis shares an essential concern with ethical economy as it is founded on a 
contradiction: human desire is always for something unobtainable. Precisely for this 
reason, desire appears to the subject as a series of equivalences, substitutions and 
exchanges.  It is this process that allows us to link together personal and social 
constitution. Obviously, this is complex, and can only be given in briefest outline 
here. However, what is so interesting about Coetzee’s novel is its miming of the 
psychic economy, the movement between the personal and the political. Indeed, the 
novel works by setting up the terms of equivalence between orders of race, gender 
and species that a culture creates. The text’s own economy operates by juxtaposing 
and problematising oppositions and/or possible exchanges. But, as we will see, the 
relationship between people and things are never quite as simple as this sketch might 
suggest.  
 
 
11 JN Nancy Being Singular Plural (2000) 44. 
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The famous statement that the unconscious is structured like a language is a way of 
understanding the operation of substitution at a psychic level. The unconscious is not 
something hidden which comes to the surface. On the contrary, it could be understood 
as separation from instinctual life (do animals have an unconscious?) The 
unconscious and culture go hand in hand. Indeed, the civilised subject is the subject 
who lacks, who is divided from a source of being. Once within the world, the subject 
becomes aware both of being an object of desire and of him or herself having 
recurring desires that cannot be satisfied. For psychoanalysis, desire is always for 
complete identification with the mother.12 At the moment that one enters language, 
when one acquires subjectivity, the subject experiences a disjuncture, a gap where the 
unconscious could be ‘located’. In this sentence ‘locate’ has to appear in quotation 
marks, as it is strictly impossible to speak of the unconscious. It is the ‘unrealised.’ 
Unconscious symptoms are attempts to articulate a reconnection with something that 
is inaccessible to the subject. 
 
Thus, the unconscious seems to exist on a plane with desire. Indeed the condition of 
desire is related to the existence of an unconscious. This, in turn can be compared to 
language (to such an extent that we can argue that the unconscious is structured like a 
language). When the child becomes a speaking/thinking subject in language, 
identification between it and the signifier is not possible, because the signifier only 
receives its identity in the series of signifiers that make up language, the system of 
differences. If desire is always desire for something else, something other, and the 
structure of the subject is such that it is always forced to desire, it is ‘at home’ in 
language which permanently defers. Just as the contents of the world, objects and 
people, can only appear meaningfully in language, language is the place where the 
subject must deploy and locate their desire.  
 
The formation of personality propels the subject towards a more profound 
identification with language. A more complex sense of the self is made to correspond 
with the name and with personal and impersonal pronouns. To have a social identity, 
the individual has to become a being in and of language. The social being must master 
the basic separation that allows any human subject to enter into the symbolic order. 
To become a mature speaker of words means accepting that to speak of yourself is to 
represent yourself, and thus, in a very real sense, to be absent from your words. 
Language employs signs or words that represent or replace absent 'things.' The 
separation of the self from the self, which allows the self to become an object to the 
self, is the basic and fundamental structure of subjectivity. It has to include the loss of 
something that might always be nothing (what one was before one could speak). At 
the same time there is a desire for unity and for a sense of being a complete self.  
 
To enter the social world is to be castrated. This can be understood as suggesting that 
prior to the human subject is a function that produces them, a wound that goes before 
them and makes them what they are. It accords with a fundamental sense of loss, the 
void, finitude, limitedness or tragedy that lies behind what we do, and has always 
informed the great religious, aesthetic and legal structures that have defined culture 
and provided rituals and supports to sustain life. As far as law is concerned, we could 
speak of the constitution, and indeed the entire system of rights and duties provided 
                                                 
12 Desire for the mother can be more broadly understood as a desire for complete being; for an end to 
the torment of singularity. It is of course impossible.  
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by law as the legal phantasm that mandates ideas of title, right, inheritance as 
structures into which one fits. It defines social life in essentially legal terms, 
effectively providing a grid that articulates relationships between people.  
 
This account of the legal phantasm would need to be clarified through a study of the 
detailed ways in which legal systems operate. However, at a general level, 
psychoanalytic theory posits that the order of law is essentially a male or phallic 
order. The primordial law in found in the imposition of culture on nature in the form 
of the incest taboo that treats the mother and the sister as forbidden objects. The name 
of the father and the structure of kinship come together to create the prohibition that 
allows genealogy and lineage. In technical terms, then, we could refer to the phallic 
order of the law. This complex topic will be developed by reference to a particular 
example of legal signification. The woman’s position in relation to the phallus is not 
the same as the man’s. The man takes up the universal position of paternity by 
identifying with other men. Take, for instance, the idea of a legal right. These are 
essentially the rights of men. Feminists have pointed out that the historical 
declarations and catalogues of rights presuppose a male, rather than a female subject. 
To be a citizen is thus to be considered as like other male citizens, a bearer of certain 
inviolable rights that define your place.  
 
The social relationship (to the extent that it is founded through the symbolic order 
which includes the law) is essentially the sexual relationship. What, then, would we 
make of the claim that, as there is no sexual relationship, there can be no social 
relationship? This claim is as much about the logic of representation and signification 
as it is about physical and emotional attachments. One of the consequences of having 
language is to be forever separated from the other, unable to coincide with them. But 
this failure opens the space of relationship anyway; “what makes up for” the [sexual] 
relationship begins from the impossibility of its ‘taking place.’13 Relationship, then, 
presupposes a greater dissonance where there can be no return to a resolution of the 
same and the other. In psychoanalytic theory this is related to the notion of the real. 
The real occupies a complex position. At a therapeutic level it can be linked to the 
symptoms that are the speech of the unconscious. From the present perspective, the 
real is that which will always return to the point when an order of discourse is 
challenged by what it has no way of articulating. Thus, a symbolic order is never 
entirely coherent with the events of the world that it tries to categorise. It may be the 
case that the interruption can be normalised, that the symbolic order can generate 
concepts or symbols to incorporate the anomaly and reduce its threat, but the threat 
can always return.  
 
What sense can we make of this? The way in which we live with others is always, in 
part, determined by the symbolic structures that characterise any given social world. 
We also need to consider the exclusions, the values put out of play, denigrated, 
marginalized or expelled from the symbolic order. These exclusions would, in 
psychoanalytic terms, be seen as prone to return as eruptions or interruptions in the 
symbolic order that the law sets up for itself.  South African law was based on the 
exclusion, or indeed the sacrifice of the rights of the majority to create a symbolic and 
political order that preserved the rights of the minority. Within this structure of 
exclusion, one could also map the points at which women were either deprived of 
                                                 
13 J Lacan Seminar XX (1998), 2.  
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rights or brought within a constitutional structure depending on the legal definition of 
their race. Clearly the constitution of the new South Africa seeks to undo this 
structured racism and sexism. The triumph of the liberation struggle could be 
understood in psychoanalytic terms, as the return of the real.  
 
The return of the real must always make for events that may or may not take symbolic 
forms. In this sense, the democratic constitution would represent a new symbolic 
order for South Africa, but one in which old forms still circulated. To return to the 
contention that ‘there can be no political relationship’ would mean that that politics, 
like the relationship between the sexes, is always founded on a fundamental and 
necessary mis-recognition between people. This is not to say that there is no way of 
choosing between political values. It is to suggest that any politics, any symbolic 
structure, will always work through a series of substitutions, elisions or deferrals.  
Indeed, any new symbolic order will be haunted by ‘returns’ from the old order. For 
complex reasons, these returns, and the practical effects that they create, can no more 
be definitively represented as any other aspect of language. Quite how they appear, 
and the effects that they have, is always a broader cultural question. From a political, 
or indeed constitutional perspective, it is, then a question of the personal and 
communal psychic structures that either do or, do not correspond with the public and 
political ones.  
 
This is the psychic setting of Disgrace. David Lurie represents himself, and is also 
represented by the novel, as one of the ‘old order’: a man whose life has been lived, 
for the most part, within apartheid. Lurie’s worldview, as reflected by the novel, 
operates through a series of symbolic equivalences- or- as we will see, a series of mis-
recognitions. The point the novel repeatedly makes is that Lurie’s understandings and 
values and the effects that they give rise to, are not necessarily congruent with the 
new political reality. Lurie’s psychic life sets up a series of equivalences between 
men, animals and women. The way in which he plays out the tensions of his own 
constitution is to find the validation of his desire, and hence himself, in a series of 
sexual ‘exchanges’. Lurie attempts to assert a ‘secret’, a ‘soul’ something that cannot 
be seen or subjected to judgment. In some ways this is a response to the symbolic 
terms of the new order. Lurie’s refusal to speak at key moments in the novel, or to 
assert an invisible ‘romantic’ essence come up against the ‘real’ of the new South 
Africa. This leads Lurie to a form of psychic paralysis. He is unable to crate a 
structure that allows him to understand the events of the novel: the rape of his 
daughter, and her marriage to Petrus.  
 
At this point, we have to turn from the representation of Lurie to the representative 
structure of the novel itself. At the level of the novel, there is a slippage between 
animal and species, or more specifically, between animal and race. Is Coetzee 
suggesting that the relationship between blacks and whites in South Africa is 
equivalent to the relationship between animals and humans? The way in which the 
novel addresses the terms of this new constitution is to confront Lurie with the most 
brutal manifestation of the new order; which is in fact still the real of the political 
order: black exclusion from property and power. But what ‘message’ is drawn from 
this fact? The next section will argue that the novel prevents us from answering this 
question: indeed, it provokes us in the most powerful way because it cannot resolve 
the relationships between the very terms that it sets up for itself. Does Disgrace ever 
articulate its own secrets?  
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Disgrace   
 
What follows is a description of the constitution of David Lurie; a recreation of his 
inner monologue:  
 
He lives within his income, within his temperament, within his emotional means. Is he happy? By most 
measurements, yes, he believes he is. However, he has not forgotten the last chorus of Oedipus: Call no 
man happy until he is dead.14  
 
Lurie is a man who lives within his means. This complacency is undercut by the stark 
final sentence that functions as a reminder of a different economy: one measured by 
the extreme of finitude: the happiness of the dead. This is a peculiar happiness; 
presumably that of stasis, of forgetting- of being at rest; a cancelling out of life and 
emotion; a zero point. For Lurie this is the authentic measure that must judge all. This 
exercise in self-assessment is Lurie realising the impossible measure of his 
singularity. However, singularity of being is not simply this being towards death. Our 
singularity always brings us into contact with others.  
 
As the novel opens, Lurie is enjoying his dalliance with a prostitute called Soraya 
(probably ‘not her real name’15). Lurie’s problems are suggested by the Oedipal 
overtones of this relationship: ‘[t]echincally he is old enough to be her father; but 
then, technically, one can be a father at twelve.’16 Lurie’s affair with Soraya, an 
exchange of money for sex that has become affection, plays itself out on the screen of 
the father’s desire for the daughter. From the Freudian perspective this is the structure 
that both reflects and founds the differences between the sexes. We cannot trace the 
complexities of this process- but- in summary, it creates the standard of normal 
sexuality as essentially male. The female is bereft of the penis, and perhaps even of 
libido as well. For Freud, this leads to the inscrutable mystery: what does woman 
want? The daughter resolves her dilemma by trying to win her father’s love, and thus 
competing with the mother. In the most general sense, (as outlined in the section 
above) it is what founds the social as the community of men; a society based on the 
exchange of women; thus, a society of exchange based on the value of something that 
remains a mystery; a secret. Sure enough, there is no recognition that passes between 
Lurie and Soraya. She ‘reveals nothing.’17 He has to pay a private detective to track 
her down when she leaves the Discrete Escorts Agency. In receipt of her private 
number, he rings her up:  
 
A long silence before she speaks. “I don’t know who you are,” she says, “You are harassing me in my 
own house. I demand you will never phone me here again, never.18  
 
A non correspondence- a failure of communication; a breakdown of recognition. 
Lurie has already confessed to her: ‘I miss you all the time.’19 What prompts the 
breakdown of their relationship is a chance encounter. He spies her on the streets of 
Cape Town with her children. Neither mentions the encounter, ‘Your secret is safe 
                                                 
14 Coetzee (n3 above) 2. 
15 Coetzee (n3 above) 3. 
16 Coetzee (n3 above) 1. 
17 Coetzee (n3 above) 3. 
18 Coetzee (n3 above) 10. 
19 Coetzee (n3 above) 1. 
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with me, he would like to say.’20  But what is this secret? That Lurie is the owner of 
the phallus? This does not lead to a relationship. It produces a non correspondence; a 
failure of exchange and proportion.  Perhaps the real secret is that of the impotence of 
the father. 
 
This failure of correspondence is a pattern that carries itself forward into Lurie’s 
relationship with his student Melanie Isaac. His encounter with Melanie is an 
interruption in the ‘featureless’ passage of time; once again, the same Oedipal scene 
plays itself out. She is “thirty years his junior”21 and later ‘a child he thinks: no more 
than a child! What am I doing?’22; later still, ‘[h]e makes love her one more time, on 
the bed in his daughter’s room.’23  The father desiring the daughter. Lurie seeks the 
community and intimacy that love can bring. It is a ‘flash of revelation and a flash of 
response’; a question of ‘passion.’24 Is this Lurie’s fantasy? Even as he seduces her, it 
is as if he is playing out a fantasy.  His fantasy is structured on the idea that he is 
potent, that he is as desirable to her as she is to him. It is based on the possibility of 
exchange; that their desire for each other has some value; values set up and 
perpetuated by a culture of romantic love:  
 
“Stay. Spend the night with me.” 
Across the rim of the cup she regards him steadily. “Why?” 
“Because you ought to.” 
“Why ought I to?” 
“Why? Because a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone. It is part of the bounty she brings into 
the world. She has a duty to share it.”25  
 
The currency the lovers spend. Her obligations are to beauty and love. The prose 
itself, the way that it is ‘scored’, suggest that this is always already a failure. An old 
man talking to a young woman. She is regarding him across the rim of the cup with 
suspicion. The allusions are lost on her; no references are shared. Later on, when 
Lurie quotes a Shakespearian Sonnet, this attempt to speak the language of love only 
‘estranges.’26 Why does it ring so hollow? It is not that Lurie is entirely self-
deceiving. He knows that he is playing out a scene; he has this much self-knowledge. 
But is there something hidden from him? He does not, in the end, know why he does 
‘it’. At least in terms of the seduction scene, it does not work because it is so one 
sided- it is based on assumptions not shared. So, when he finally has sex with her (she 
remains ‘passive’)- he ‘tumbles into a blank oblivion.’27  
 
Throughout this section of the novel, Melanie herself remains blank. We are not privy 
to her thoughts, just as Lurie is not. The text repeats her inscrutability. It repeats her 
secret. Lurie ties to end the affair, and re-assert the student-teacher relationship. He 
imagines her saying:  
 
“You have cut me off from everyone…You have made me bear your secret….”28 
                                                 
20 Coetzee (n3 above) 6. 
21 Coetzee (n3 above) 12. 
22 Coetzee (n3 above) 20. 
23 Coetzee (n3 above) 29. 
24 Coetzee (n3 above) 13. 
25 Coetzee (n3 above) 16. 
26 Coetzee (n3 above) 16. 
27 Coetzee (n3 above) 19. 
28 Coetzee (n3 above) 34. 
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Melanie’s words echo those from the passage above. The relationship has not lead to 
any sharing, any reciprocity. Moreover, the obligation, the duty has come from Lurie. 
The secret, it would seem, is this isolation: ‘you have cut me off from everyone’—
but—this is still not her secret- as it is Lurie’s own estimation, his own imagination of 
her words (which, when they come, are far more prosaic). He must even create an 
inner life for her: one that mirrors his own:  
 
She rises, slings her bag over her shoulder. 
“Melanie, I have responsibilities….Don’t make the situation more complicated than it need be.” 
Responsibilities: she does not dignify the word with a reply.29  
 
So—the affair ends with Lurie appreciating his responsibilities- their necessary 
complications. Melanie’s final silence, in fact this is her last appearance in the text as 
such, is to refuse to respond. If Lurie’s responsibilities have any meaning, they have 
to meet this silence, this refusal to engage, because there is no language that he shares 
with her.  
 
The great focus of this first part of the novel is the description of the disciplinary 
hearing that meets to consider Lurie’s case after Melanie makes an allegation of 
sexual harassment against him. It would be tempting to see this as a representation of 
‘law’ in the novel. However, the disciplinary panel, as it explains itself to Lurie, has 
‘no power’, it ‘merely makes recommendations.’30 Secondly, if law is the figure of 
truth and revelation, nothing is revealed. Indeed, one of the panel members protests, 
in the face of Lurie’s ‘evasions’, that the ‘wider community’ is ‘entitled to know’31the 
truth about the affair; a secret that Lurie will not reveal. The scene pits the law, or at 
least this quasi law against a different logic. When Lurie is asked if he has any legal 
objection to the composition of the panel, he states he has ‘reservations of a 
philosophical kind.’32 His strategy is to plead guilty to the harassment charge, and, 
despite his colleagues and friends who want to ‘save’ him, to reveal his own 
interiority, his own secret:  
 
“What goes on in my mind is my business….Frankly, what you want from me is not a response but a 
confession. Well, I make no confession. I put forward a plea, as is my right. Guilty as charged. That is 
my plea. That is as far as I am prepared to go.”33  
 
He retells the narrative:  
 
“Our paths crossed. Words passed between us, and at that moment something happened which, not 
being a poet, I will not try to describe. Suffice to say that Eros entered. After that I was not the same…I 
was not myself. I was no longer a fifty year old divorce at a loose end. I became a servant of eros.”34 
 
How does the text ask us to judge Lurie? If his defiance of the panel is presented as a 
kind of heroic stupidity, an attempt to oppose his own truth to that of the law, then, he 
must be judged as self-deceiving. The point is that he was precisely the same as 
himself. As a serial seducer of women, he was not so much the servant of eros, as 
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playing out a scene in which he knew he did not believe. When Lurie is asked by a 
member of the panel if he regrets his affair with the student, he persists:  
 
“Are you sorry?… 
No, he says, I was enriched by the experience.”35 
 
The operative word, a word that Lurie repeats later is “enriched”. His belief is that his 
relationship with the student is an experience of beauty. However, this view makes 
sense only in Lurie’s ‘economy of the same’; his ego supporting itself in a fantasy of 
being out of control that in fact conceals his own impotence. This connects with the 
final exchange of the chapter:  
 
“…we went through the repentance business yesterday. I told you what I thought. I wont do it. I 
appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that secular 
tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. 
Repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse.”36  
  
If Lurie is withholding repentance for his acts, if repentance is, in part, the secret, 
where does it ‘belong’? Is this linked to the statement about the happiness of death on 
the first page? Does this suggest a different order, invisible to the characters, but 
increasingly put into circulation by the plot of the novel? This is why this scene is so 
central. The reader senses (at least on re-reading) that this scene of judgement triggers 
everything that happens in the remainder of the novel. It opens onto an economy 
where there is no leniency, where there is no formalism, where it simply appears that 
‘things happen’-or- where Lurie is forced to confront his desire and his decisions; 
where he is forced to repent.  
 
The ‘central’ part of the novel, the sections that cover the period after Lurie leaves 
Cape Town, and before the attack, focus on his relationship with his daughter. We 
become aware of a wider history; a sense of the broader politics of South Africa. 
Indeed, Lurie ponders that ‘history had the larger share’ in her upbringing and her 
desire to return to the land. As critics have commentated, the book sets up something 
of a pastoral. The earlier themes are repeated in a minor key. Although Lurie has 
tended to see his affairs with women in terms of father/daughter relationships- his 
own relationship with his daughter is not particularly characterised by intimacy. He 
fails to understand his own desire, and that of his daughter. Thinking of Lucy’s 
partner, Helen, who has ‘returned to Johannesburg.’ Lurie reflects:  
 
And what does he know about these two in particular, Lucy and Helen? Perhaps they sleep together 
merely as children do, cuddling, touching, giggling, reliving girlhood –sisters more than lovers.37   
 
Lucy confronts her father over the affair with his student. In replying to her, he 
appreciates that his behaviour before the panel was hysterical. However, this is not 
accompanied by a more profound self-realisation; and if anything, the time that he 
spends with his daughter confirms his prejudices. He feels that she has made the 
wrong choices. Lucy is, however, compassionate towards her father. He is invited to 
stay on the farm for as long as is necessary. The theme of compassion is linked to the 
Bev Shaw character and her work at the animal sanctuary. Ultimately, this takes us to 
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the theme of life in common; what it means to live together. Responding to her 
father’s ‘dislike’ of Bev Shaw, because, in Lurie’s words, ‘[she is] not going to lead 
me to a higher life’, Lucy states:  
 
“…the reason is that there is no higher life. This is the only life that there is. Which we share with 
animals. That’s the example that people like Bev try to set. That’s the example I want to follow. To 
share some of our human privileges with the animals.”38  
  
Critics have argued that the theme of compassion for animals is the moral centre of 
the book. It sets up the theme of a life that is shared, albeit on radically different 
terms; and suggests that the suffering of animals is part of the more general circuit of 
cruelty against other human beings. But, if we look more closely at this theme, where 
does it take us? Lurie comes to learn from Bev Shaw that animals suffer. He helps 
Bev Shaw administer the injections that will destroy the unwanted dogs:  
 
He has thought that he would get used to it. But that is not what happens. The more killings he assists 
in, the more jittery he gets. On Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop 
at the roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake.39   
 
If animals do fear death, do sense what is happening and fear it and despise it, then at 
the centre of the book is a crime that is perhaps far greater than those committed 
against Lurie and his daughter. Does the book suggest that this is where compassion 
and responsibility has to start? Perhaps Lurie has recovered his moral compass.  
 
The attack on Lurie and his daughter must remain within the terms of the book. But it 
is the central event, the terrible axis on which the novel turns. It points directly to the 
question of economy:  
 
A risk to own anything: a car, a pair of shoes, a packet of cigarettes. Not enough to go round, not 
enough cars, shoes, cigarettes. Too many people, too few things. What there is must go into circulation, 
so that everybody can have a chance to be happy for a day. That is the theory…Not human evil, just a 
vast circulatory system, to whose workings pity and terror are irrelevant. That is how one must see life 
in this country: in its schematic aspect. Otherwise one could go mad. Cars, shoes; women too. There 
must be some niche in the system for women and what happens to them.40  
 
It is as if the novel has its own hierarchy of creation: men, women, animals and  
things. What Lurie perceives in the passage above is the reduction of a person to an 
object. His daughter has been raped, used, treated like a thing, or an animal. She has 
become part of the ‘vast circulatory’ system that, as the novel will come to suggest, 
includes the history of the country and the way the crimes of the past become crimes 
of the present. The “vast circulatory” system, history itself, inscribes us in its 
processes. Our agency is largely irrelevant. In place of the earlier verdict of law, of 
legal process, there are now only historical processes. Random events. The actions of 
strangers: ‘it happens every day, every hour, every minute, he tells himself, in every 
quarter of the country.’   
 
The secret comes to circulate in this economy:  
 
                                                 
38 Coetzee (n3 above) 74. 
39 Coetzee (n3 above) 143. 
40 Coetzee (n3 above) 98. 
 12
“David, when people ask, would you mind keeping to your own story. To what happened to you?” 
He does not understand 
“You tell what happened to you, I tell what happened to me,” 
She repeats…”41 
 
What they both know must not be spoken. A different kind of silence to the ones that 
opened the book, a silence that creates its own economy; indeed, that brings in the 
new political order.42 The secret cannot be exchanged between father and daughter. 
Indeed, each comes to a resolution that is opposed to the other. Lurie demands a 
police investigation. For Lucy, it is a private affair, ‘her business’43, there is no point 
‘involving the law’. Is this an attempt to create a “private salvation” an expiation ‘for 
the crimes of the past’44? 
 
How, then, do we read the conclusion of the novel? It is presented as a choice that 
Lurie faces.  Does he save a dog to which he has become attached from being put 
down? He anticipates the scene of taking the dog into the surgery, helping Bev 
administer the injection, and then putting it into a black bag and taking it to the 
incinerator: ‘[i]t will be little enough, less than little: nothing’45:   
 
Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery. “I thought you were saving him for 
another week”, says Bev Shaw. “Are you giving him up?”  
“Yes I am giving him up.”46   
 
It is hard to relate this ending to the book with any sense of completion; how does this 
point a conclusion? 
  
Lucy bears the rapist’s child and marries Petrus against Lurie’s wishes. Already this 
event is open to multiple interpretations. One could re-imagine the events of the novel 
re-told from Lucy’s perspective. Indeed. it may even be that Lucy’s act forms the 
ethical centre of the novel; a perspective obscured by the narrative focus on Lurie. 
This reading would be qualified by returning to the point that her position is very 
much one of compromise and exchange. In bearing the child she places Petrus under 
an obligation to bring her into his family and to protect her. At a symbolic level, 
arguing that Lucy’s act provides the necessary reconciliation is also problematic. It 
would be tantamount to asserting equivalence between rape and the possibility of a 
new social order. To some extent this would fit in with the logic of sacrifice discussed 
above. Lucy has been sacrificed, or has sacrificed herself for the new order. The 
daughter must bear the sins of her fathers. Although there is some suggestion that 
Lucy’s act is some ‘expiation’ for historic crimes, it does not seem to be a sensible 
way of reading the novel.  
 
Lurie himself remains in Grahamstown growing older. What does his sacrifice of the 
dog suggest? It can be read as implying that there must then be some relationship 
between the abuse of animals and the crimes of the apartheid order. Can this equation 
be made? What does it suggest about the novelistic consciousness that has set this 
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narrative up? It is, at best, a very problematic way of understanding apartheid- and 
opens up a set of difficult questions about whether crimes against humanity can be 
related to crimes against animals. What makes it necessary to think this way? It would 
be tempting to assume that these are the values of Coetzee himself. Can a relationship 
between species really equate to that between races? It could be argued that this is an 
evasion of the issue. Cultural oppression has been transformed into a ‘philosophical’ 
question of animal suffering. Surely human suffering has to be seen precisely as 
human suffering. Furthermore, equating apartheid and cruelty against animals would 
lead to a further problem: the representation of cruelty in the novel. Cruelty against 
animals may be common to both white and black characters, but the novel does dwell 
upon the ways in which the poor black farmers and workers mistreat their animals. It 
is difficult to draw any simple conclusion, although, it is hard to avoid the sense that, 
once again, a form of racial cruelty has been sidelined. These complicated questions 
are themselves returned to in the later text, Elizabeth Costello; perhaps suggesting that 
they are left deliberately unresolved in Disgrace. However, there is another 
interpretation.  
 
less than little: nothing 
 
Does, then, the novel retain its own secret? What does the secret force us to articulate: 
less than little: nothing?  
 
We run risks in saying that the novel says the unsayable about post apartheid- given- 
as argued- that the social order is always based on miss-recognition. From this 
perspective, how can we read the conclusion? Ultimately, the book resists any simple 
reading. What then is this “less than little: nothing”, is it the secret? Is it the secret of 
compassion, of knowing that there is no real communication, no real exchange 
between others, between men, between men and women, but that is what “fellowship” 
is based upon?  
 
Something very little, nothing, that we share between us? Men, women and animals.  
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